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HOUSING MODULE DESIGNED FOR USE ON TENSION LEG OFFSHORE OIL 
PLATFORM WAS NOT A VESSEL FOR LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION ACT PURPOSES AND WHERE CLAIMANT'S EMPLOYMENT 
WAS LOCATED SOLELY ON LAND CLAIMANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
COMPENSATION UNDER THE ACT 
James Baker, Jr. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, United States 
Department of Labor; Gulf Island Marine Fabricators, L.L. C. 
834 F.3d 542 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. 
(Filed on August, 20 1 6) 
The issue before the court was whether the Benefits Review Board (BRB) erred in its 
ruling that James Baker was not eligible for benefits under the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
(OCSLA) following an injury that occurred during the construction of an offshore oil rig (Big 
Foot). The United States Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit affirmed the judgment of the BRB, 
holding that he was not a maritime employee for the purpose of recovering under the 
LHWCA, and that a significant nexus did not exist between his employment and the resource 
extraction activities occurring on the outer Continental Shelf, thereby precluding the claim 
for benefits under OCSLA. 1 
· 
James Baker, Jr., a marine carpenter employed by Gulf Island Marine Fabricators, 
L.L.C., allegedly was injured while constructing the housing for the "tension leg offshore oil 
platform" Big Foot. 2 A hearing was held to determine if benefits could be claimed under the 
two Acts. An Administrative Law Judge denied benefits on the grounds that he was "not 
engaged in maritime employment," as Big Foot "was not a vessel" under the LHWCA. 3 
Furthermore there was "no significant causal link between Baker's alleged injury and 
operations in the OCS," precluding benefits under the OCSLA.4 Baker appealed this decision 
to the Benefits Review Board, which affirmed the AU's ruling. Baker then appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit. 
The Benefits Review Board must uphold the ruling of the judge if it is based on 
substantial evidence. Evidence is substantial if it is the kind that would "cause a reasonable 
person to accept the fact finding."5 
The LHWCA first enacted in 1 927 established a "federal workers' compensation 
scheme" for maritime workers.6 In 1972 the Act's scope was expanded to incorporate 
workers injured during maritime activities "occurring on land near the water." 7 To meet this 
requirement the claimant must satisfy "situs" and "status" requirements. 8 Both parties 
stipulated that Baker met the situs requirement as he was working at a maritime facility. But 
the issue still remained as to whether he met the status requirement of maritime employment 
as defined by U.S.C. section 902(3), which includes, but is not limited to, "ship repairman, 
1 Baker v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 834 F.3d 542, 544 (5 th Cir. 2016). 
2 !d. 
3 !d. 
4 /d. 
5 ld, at 545. (citing Coastal Prod. Servs. Inc. v. Hudson, 555 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2009)t 
6 /d. 
7 !d. 
R /d. 
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shipbuilder, and ship-breaker."9 The Supreme Court expanded this definition to include 
"activities that are integral or essential part of the loading, unloading, building, or repairing of 
a vessel ."10 The court then needed to determine whether Big Foot for the purposes of the 
LHWCA was a vessel. 
The court agreed with the conclusion of the ALI and the BRB that Big Foot is not a 
vessel .  According to the Supreme Court the word "vessel" is to include "every description of 
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
transportation over water." 11 This definition was then incorporated into the language of the 
LHWCA .  The court found that Big Foot has no means of self-propulsion, no steering 
mechanism or rudder, and has an no raked bow. 12 Furthermore, Big Foot "is only intended to 
travel over water once in the next twenty years." 13 These facts would lead the reasonable 
observer to conclude that Big Foot was not a vessel meant to carry "people or things" over 
water. 14 Further reinforcing this is Big Foot's  mission. Once in place over the outer 
Continental Shelf Big Foot would be anchored in place so as to conduct resource extraction 
from the shelf. 
The court ruled that this determination is in l ine with existing precedent .  The same 
court ruled in Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co. Inc that a "work punt was not a vessel ." 15 A 
work punt is floating structure that, although maneuverable around a maritime work site, 
"functioned as a work platform and was not designed for or engaged in the business of 
navigation." 16 Fundamental to the analysis of the Bernard court was the punt's lack of all 
"indicia of a structure designed for navigation such as "[a] raked bow," "means of self­
propulsion," or "crew quarters or navigational l ights" 17 Big Foot l ikewise lacked the 
"indicia" of a contrivance intended for navigation as it had no means of serving the purpose 
of transporting people or things over water. Therefore, as Baker's employment did not relate 
to a vessel, he is precluded from claiming benefits under the LHCW A .  
Lastly, and more simply, the court determined whether a significant nexus existed 
between Baker's employment and the resource extraction projects at the outer Continental 
Shelf, thereby al lowing him to claim benefit under OCSLA. The court concluded that no such 
nexus can be establ ished. The OCSLA extends the coverage of the LHWCA to "inj ur[ies] 
occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the purpose 
of exploring for, developing, removing, or transporting by pipeline the natural resources .. . 
of the outer Continental Shelf." 18 Under the Supreme Court ' s  ruling in Valladolid v. Pac. 
Operations Offshore, LLP, the nexus is establ ished if the injured employee can "establish a 
significant causal l ink between the injury he suffered and his employer's on-OCS operations 
conducted for the purpose of extracting natural resources from the OCS . "  19 Baker's inj ury 
occurred on dry land while constructing "the l iving and dining �uarters for [Big Foot]," and 
therefore the court concluded that no significant nexus existed.2 The court reasoned that 
Baker' s  employment activities were too "attenuated from future purpose of extracting natural 
9 !d.( citing 33 U.S.C. � 902(3)) 
10 /d. 
11 /d. (citing I U.S.C. §3) 
12 Baker, supra note 142 at 545. 
13 !d. at 547. 
14 /d. 
15 !d. (citing Bernard, 741 F.2d at 830) 
16 Baker, supra note 142 at 547. 
17 /d. (citing Bernard, 741 F.2d at 832) 
18 !d. (citing 43 U.S.C. � 1333(3)(b)) 
19 /d, (citing Valladolid v. Pac. Operations Offshore, LLP, 132 S. Ct 680,685 (2012)) 
20 Baker, supra note 142 at 548. 
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--resources from the OCS for the OCS LA to cover his  injury."21 All of Baker's employment 
occurred on dry land, while in Valladolid "the deceased" "spent ninety-eight percent of his 
time on an offshore dri l l ing platform."22 Furthermore Baker never traveled to the OCS, had 
no role in moving Big Foot into position over the OCS,  nor wi l l  he have a role in operating 
Big Foot once in position. 23 
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the ALl preventing Baker from 
claiming benefits under the L HWCA, as he was not a maritime employee and under OCSLA, 
there was no nexus between his injury and resource extraction operations occurring at the 
OCS .  
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